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ABSTRACT
Using a hermeneutic strategic relational approach, this article examines the elements
of the material and ideational international context directly relevant to develop-
ment in Mexico. It opens with a section on relations between the United States and
Mexico. The myriad of complex and multifaceted interactions, history and poten-
tialities has been –and will remain– of utmost importance for both countries. The
next part focuses on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which,
evaluated under its own terms, has unquestionably been successful. Trade and
investment have increased, and the ad hoc dispute settlement mechanism operat-
ed regularly in cases presented by each member. Yet, there are immense numbers
of things that NAFTA cannot accommodate, as it has been narrowly conceived only
as a trade agreement, albeit an expanded one. These omissions are of key relevance
and must be spotlighted along with the agreement’s relative successes for a serious,
informed discussion to take place about the prospects of deepening NAFTA. Like-
wise, the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would mean
broadening its scope and membership. These are some of the key issues in the stra-
tegically selective context for the social processes of change in Mexico in the last
few decades. Crucial challenges also lie ahead. If room for manoeuvre has existed
in the past, there is a good chance that it will be greater in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Acknowledging that the Western Hemisphere and the North American region exist
independently of our knowledge does not necessarily lead us to make only direct obser-
vations of relationships. Discourse and appearance in the socio-political and socio-eco-
nomic world influence our perceptions and what we can read from ongoing processes.
Since as observers, we are also simultaneously participants, what we either perceive
or mis-perceive affects our understanding and interpretations. That is why interna-
tional relations researchers constantly need to assess and determine where we are
situated. Interpretive analysis in this article should be understood as a cartographic
experience, one that actually illuminates where we are and also where we are heading.
To do this, mapping and situating actors and agencies within broader process-
es is by no means an easy task. Not only may tendencies and undercurrents pro-
vide mixed signals, but uncertainty and the lack of predictability are constant
features in both domestic and international politics. What this article proposes is a
narrative understanding of the regional integration processes Mexico has been tak-
ing part in for a number of years now. Mexico’s historic relationship to, contact
with, and proximity to the United States has influenced the processes in which both
countries take part, although never in a deterministic way. The North American
Free Trade Agreement successful partnership and support for the stymied Free
Trade Area of the Americas project are cases in point.
The theoretical purpose of interpreting Mexico-U.S. relations, the NAFTA expe-
rience and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project is to restore agency to
supposedly anonymous processes and political analysis to the logic of economic
compulsion and determinism. By focusing on each actor’s action and the manoeu-
vering room, the methodological objective of these efforts is to transcend empirical
materialism and show the relevance of a proper discussion of ideas and their
weight in the historic and contemporary real world.1
THE ASYMMETRICAL, DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES
The relationship between Mexico and the United States has gone through signifi-
cant changes at different times in history. Ever since right after both countries’ inde-
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1 The dichotomy between reality and appearance is approached by adopting a critical realist philosophy of
science position. Emphasis is put on interpretive knowledge, built on the identification of social phe-
nomena causal powers.
pendence, bilateral relations have ranged from conflict to cooperation. Even though
I concentrate on the contemporary period, the weight of the past and the historical
memory for both sides cannot be completely neglected. Equally importantly, the
already large, but still widening, range of interactions has been informed by ideas,
perceptions, and myths that account for key factors hitherto unobserved (Aguayo,
1998).2 They all have also played a causal constitutive role in material outcomes.
Using an interpretative account, it becomes clear that the asymmetries between
Mexico and the United States have been key constant variables permeating all facets
of their relationships. Contrasting available resources, military might, political orga-
nization and practices, diplomatic strategies, sets of values, cultural characteristics,
and so on, in the past considered reasons for keeping a certain distance, over recent
decades have been overtly endorsed as opportunities not to be missed. The different
combination of the elements of consent, coercion, and hegemony present in the inter-
national system can easily be found in the annals of the relationship between the
United States and Latin American countries. Nonetheless, the contemporary period
has tilted toward a range of methods and strategies to convince Latin America that
it is in its interest to actively collaborate with the United States, as the scope of shared
and similar objectives increases. Epitomizing the exercise of hegemony has been the
U.S. obsession with political and economic stability beyond its borders. In some
cases, features of regimes abroad were considered secondary as long as they did not
threaten the interests of individual countries. This was the case for the former hege-
monic ruling party that held office in Mexico for seven decades.3
Ever since the end of the armed phases of the early-twentieth-century Mexican
Revolution, there has been an evolving pragmatic understanding between the gov-
ernments on either side of the Rio Grande.4 This kind of pragmatism reflects the
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2 For instance, Aguayo argues that myths, such as the U.S. exceptionalism that sets it apart from the rest of
the world, are completely inaccurate and misleading. Similarly, the claim that whatever course of action
the United States takes has only positive repercussions in the international arena has clearly been dis-
credited. Equally discredited is the assumption that corruption and inefficiency are pervasive for the pub-
lic sector, but absent from the private realm (Aguayo, 1998).
The misperception of Mexico as an insular, passive, nationalistic country could not be farther from the
truth. Likewise, the identification of common interests between Mexico and the United States does not
mean that divergent points of view are out of the question. Taking for granted that Mexican foreign policy
is guided only by principles such as self–determination, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and the peaceful
resolution of conflicts is an idealistic approach which neglects its increasing pragmatism (Aguayo, 1998).
3 Another example is the one provided by Chilean history. On September 11, 1973, Allende, a democrati-
cally elected president, was overthrown and killed by the local military with U.S. government support.
Pinochet went on to implement an economic program more in tune with U.S. priorities, and ever since has
been portrayed as an example for countries embarking on economic restructuring.
4 The roots and original dynamics of the pragmatic understanding between the United States and Mexico
can be traced back to the late 1920s. After the re-elected President Obregón was assassinated in 1928, U.S.
Ambassador to Mexico Dwight Morrow, supported Calles and reached a high level of understanding with
him. During the late 1920s, Calles made important concessions to U.S. oil companies in exchange for
asymmetries and the ideas that each has of the other. As they inform the courses of
action taken and the strategies adopted, they yield a causal constitutive role in the
material world. The role played by intangibles like ideas, information, perceptions,
and even myths in the complex and multi-level interactions between the United
States and Mexico has been used mainly –but not exclusively– to maintain the rela-
tionship, not exempt from touches of hegemony, and also to maintain the established
order (Aguayo, 1998).
In terms of the democratic credentials of Mexico’s previous one-party rule, the
United States did not worry unduly about the other’s diplomacy. Mexico’s political
and economic stability was a concern for the United States, regardless of how good
or bad its democratic model was. The principles of non-intervention, self-determi-
nation, and peaceful resolution of conflicts guiding Mexican foreign policy were
not a cause for anxiety to the United States, as the latter perceived the former to be
frequently at odds with them only in matters of secondary importance. Regarding
more important issues, some U.S. Department of the Army declassified documents
stated that “in case of war… (or any other critical situation) Mexico would be an
ally of the United States” (Aguayo, 1998: 56).5
The unwritten rules of the pragmatic understanding on commitments to mutu-
al support established around shared interests evolved after World War II. Further
formal agreements between the two countries have been inspired by the informal,
pragmatic understanding typified by that between former Mexican President Calles
and former U.S. Ambassador Morrow. Although never formalized in treaties or pro-
tocols, it became a tool of the utmost importance for the discreet resolution of dif-
ferences. As relations have moved through different historic phases, the pragmatic,
flexible understanding between the two governments has undergone gradual mod-
ifications. One of them has been the U.S. elite’s sometimes overt –and sometimes
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Washington’s support in preserving his regime’s nationalistic image. Although Cárdenas later expropri-
ated the oil industry in 1938, the pragmatic orientation of the relationship continued and strengthened
over time (Aguayo, 1998).
5 Nonetheless, in a famous case a few years ago, the United States did not get the unconditional support it
wanted for its self-proclaimed crusade against terrorism. Holding a temporary seat at the United Nations
Security Council, Mexico, along with a few other countries, did not back the U.S. initiative to attack Iraq
in 2003. Minor diplomatic skirmishes followed.
There is no room here for a discussion about this conflict, which has extremely complex historical,
geo-strategic, military, religious, energy, and political connotations. Suffice it to say that the open U.S. mil-
itary involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, in its self-proclaimed crusade against terrorism, was original-
ly justified on the basis of faulty intelligence and too little evidence. Its closest ally, the United Kingdom,
was also unable to defend the case for going to war. However, this was not an impediment to seizing more
direct control over oil and gas resources from the region, despite its disclaimers to the contrary. Those
actions are radically transforming, with unknown consequences, not only U.S. relations with the Arab
countries but with the whole world. In addition to the significance of the energy resources of that region,
U.S. military involvement, along with the thorny issue of its overt and covert support of Israel in its con-
flict with Palestine, infuriates nations in this Islamic region, which may yet have serious consequences.
covert– support in pursuing the economic and political stability favorable to its
interests in Mexico. In particular, it has supported the latter’s civilian rule without
democracy (Aguayo, 1998; Mazza, 2001).
Needless to say, the pragmatic understanding between the governments is not
limited to the adoption of flawed models of government, nor to the increases in both
the volume and value of economic transactions. Due to the asymmetries between
Mexico and the United States, when the latter has exercised coercion, the former
has little defense. With its small armed forces and stock of weapons, pragmatic for-
eign policy prevented Mexico from signing a military accord with the U.S., and from
entering the continental military alliance embodied in the Rio Pact.6 Yet, this strategy
was modified in the light of changing circumstances during the Cold War. A previ-
ous security strategy of abnegation has been abandoned for bandwagoning. The
former entailed eschewing alliances with any rival of the United States and pursu-
ing no foreign policy interests that might be perceived as a threat by the latter; albeit
with little cooperation. The new strategy has increased cooperation with the United
States in security matters like drug trafficking, at the same time that it tolerates its
unilateral actions and breaches of the bilateral arrangement. It also includes build-
ing up military capability to advance “joint goals” –almost unilaterally designed– in
combating drug gangs (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001).
It surprises no one that the alliances forged to fight drug trafficking respond
more to U.S. concerns.7 Taking for granted that supply creates its own demand, the
United States has pursued unilateral moves to “certify” countries in the fight against
drug trafficking, even if it is not one of their own choosing. In turn, this has raised
strong criticisms, since the U.S. is doing this to advance the extraterritoriality of its
jurisdiction without full prior negotiation.
Due to the fact that the United States deems international security issues to be
highly significant, the strategy of bandwagoning is considered less cost-effective
for Mexico than the previous one of abnegation (Domínguez and Fernández de
Castro, 2001). At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the U.S. crusade against ter-
rorism is having serious repercussions throughout the world that go beyond the
scope and aims of this article.8 Nonetheless, it has already become –and it is likely
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6 Officially known as the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance.
7 Operations such as Intercept, Condor, Intercept II, Safeguard, Gatekeeper, Casablanca, Thunder, etc., have
meant an increase in the influence of U.S. activity within Mexico (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro,
2001). Most recently, in 2007 the Mexican government broke with longstanding tradition and extradited
major drug traffickers to face trial in the United States. A Mexican Supreme Court decision overturned the
rule banning extradition of criminals facing the death penalty in the U.S.
8 After the 2001 attacks, terrorism was added to the United States’ security agenda against drug trafficking.
These two concerns have also been added to Mexico’s original security agenda, which has historically
included the U.S. itself. The lowering of barriers to facilitate the flow of trade in goods and services, as
for some time to remain– a strategically selective contextual factor and key refer-
ence point in U.S. relations with the rest of the world. Therefore, it affects Mexico
without determining its courses of action, as happened during the Cold War.
Tied by geographical proximity, the incessant, dynamic formal and informal
networks on both sides of the border move faster than –and do not necessarily fol-
low– government preferences and official discourses. Making an effort to understand
these unfolding processes, it is possible to see that the levels of inter-societal cross-
penetration cannot be reduced to economic trade relations or political issues headed
by the respective governments. The multiple layers of identity are incontrovertible
evidence that there are very strong social processes and dynamics whose rich and
constantly changing trends and counter-trends cannot be captured by the narrowly
defined free trade agreement. Intergovernmental cooperation has formalized and
institutionalized what is in fact the leading role of the situated actors in context, sig-
nificantly contributing toward changing the conditions surrounding them.
Due to the traditionally fragmented nature of U.S. policy, in which different
agencies deal simultaneously with sometimes overlapping and contrasting agendas
and priorities, Putnam has suggested that, regarding international negotiations, there
seems to be a trade-off between the domestic and the international dimensions. In
particular, for a zero-sum game assumption, the importance given to either one level
or the other means that the strength and impact of a bargaining position abroad
could entail a weakening of its circumstances at home or vice versa (Putnam, 1988).
Yet, the reciprocal interactions between domestic and international affairs for bar-
gaining within a more centralized system such as Mexico’s are not exempt from
these scenarios. Furthermore, these dynamics at the national and international levels
cannot be easily contained and are constituted by counter-trends as well. Consider,
for instance, the increasing volume and depth of relations between the two countries,
where the growing complexity and interactions of the multilayered tapestry of actors
seem to follow patterns of decentralization at all levels. These patterns respond to
the rising numbers of actors involved (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001).
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well as investment, has contributed toward making it easier for illegal exchanges and transactions to occur.
Hence, issues such as drug trafficking and migration, both legal and illegal, have profited from reductions
in transaction costs which, in turn, have been facilitated by political and economic cooperation and insti-
tution building (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001). Still, as drug traffickers mainly act as suppli-
ers to the biggest drug market in the world, the efforts to eliminate and suppress them in other countries
have been as costly as they have been unsuccessful. Much worse, they denigrate nations by making them
submit to U.S. “certification”, which, in turn, is conditioned to a great degree by non-drug considerations.
As long as the incentives for procuring a share of such a profitable market exist, the only result is that
more powerful and better organized cartels emerge to fill vacuums left by former ones. This promotion of
specialized cartels has a high domestic price beyond U.S. borders. Not only does it contribute toward esca-
lating violence to levels previously unheard of in those societies, but it also corrupts officials and profits
from unsatisfied demands and impoverished sectors within inequitable, polarized societies.
Current outwardly-oriented economic strategies have enjoyed support and
encouragement from Washington. Mexican technocratic governments have been
praised while some big businesses have flourished, trade, and investment flows
have boomed, and income distribution has widened. In addition to the growing
inbound and outbound flows of trade and investment, important social dynamics
continuously reshape the relationships between the two countries. They are neither
merely attributable to the governments’ wills, nor are they captured by the narrow
framework of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
The Mexican government’s trade liberalization and investment attraction strat-
egies have gone through different stages. Following the 1982 crisis and import
restrictions, it adopted a gradual approach to allow for the incremental deepening
of the reforms that led to its joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
1986 and became an important component of domestic economic pacts. They, in turn,
paved the way for the North American Free Trade Agreement some years later. Im-
port license requirements were gradually liberalized, whereas import official refer-
ence prices were incrementally eliminated. Import tariffs were reduced stage by
stage as the core component of the trade liberalization strategy (Lustig, 1998; 1997;
Hufbauer and Schott, 1993).
Some of the conditions that have facilitated the implementation of the out-
wardly-oriented economic model are by no means unproblematic. In Mexico’s case,
it has resulted in an import-prone, export-oriented industrialization for an important
percentage of the manufacturing exporters. For the inbound industries, the benefits
included macroeconomic stabilization, infrastructure provision, proximity to mar-
kets, especially that of the United States, labor availability, intra-industry and inter-
industry investment and trade, compliance with quality standards, and just-in-time
delivery, among other things. Nevertheless, the implementation of the outwardly-
oriented economic strategies has helped U.S. firms to confront foreign competitors,
leaving Mexico a sub-specialization at the lower end of value-added commodities
chains (Dussel Peters, 2000; Gereffi, Spener and Bair, 2002).
If the costly social legacy of inequality and polarization of the crude implemen-
tation of the outward-oriented economic model are to be corrected, the reinvigoration
of the domestic market, on the one hand, and the promotion and strengthening of
endogenous growth with equity conditions, on the other, call for adequate redistribu-
tive policies, along with increased spending on education, health, and social infra-
structure. Adramatic process of Polanyi’s first movement’s commodification has been
the consequence of economic structural adjustment and labor flexibility –either
intended or unintended– and has meant a drastic decline in real wages for a ma-
jority of the population, forcing them to look for alternatives to compensate for the
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decline in their total income.9 The need to seek new or additional income-generat-
ing activities contributed to a growing black market, especially, but not exclusively,
in the main urban areas. Likewise, more family members were sent into the work-
force to get additional income.
With regard to polarization and widening inequalities in Mexico, suffice it to
say that in contrast to the negative impact of the economic constraints on the worst-
off social sectors, the liberalization of capital flows allowed some of the better-off not
only to protect their assets, but also to expand them by transferring them abroad
(Lustig, 1998). If these problems are to be addressed, there is no doubt that the state
has an important role to play in Mexico’s future economic development. Due to
widespread poverty and unsatisfied social needs, an enhanced agenda of reform
which reassesses the importance of production and redistribution must not be post-
poned any longer. In short, efforts need to be made to tackle destitution and pro-
mote social justice.
Nevertheless, problematic as the poorly designed North American Free Trade
Agreement is, analysts acknowledge it has been consistent and successful in its own
terms. Ever since the very beginning, it aimed to eliminate trade barriers, to attract
trade and investment flows, and to provide a dispute settlement mechanism between
Canada, the United States and Mexico (Hufbauer and Schott, 1993; Lustig, 1997).
Unquestionably, it has clearly succeeded in the narrow terms in which it was con-
ceived. Trade and investment have soared, while the ad hoc dispute settlement mech-
anism has been operated and tested by all members. It has also had an impact on
specialization in producing certain goods and in some sectors, as growing intra-
industry and intra-firm trade flows indicate (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001a). The develop-
ment of economies of scale and the promotion of efficiency standards are deemed
key elements in easing economic integration within the three countries of North
America. No less important, issues and sectors the signatories wanted to ignore in
the negotiations were deliberately set aside so that an agreement could be reached.
Had sensitive issues been included at the very beginning, negotiators might have
faced stronger domestic constituencies, leading to a radicalization of each country’s
position at the negotiation table. Thus, the U.S. government opted to omit migra-
tion; the Mexican government, the energy sector; and Canadians, cultural issues. As
the relationships have evolved, this increases the likelihood that the special status
granted by their governments might face modifications in the future.
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9 Arguing that labor, land, and money are essential for a market economy, Polanyi stresses that it is not the
same thing as considering them commodities, since they are not, because none of them were produced for
sale on the market. The fiction of their being so produced became an organizing principle of society; they
all became commodified (1957). Knowledge was added later by neo-Polanyians to the original three ficti-
tious commodities.
The North American Free Trade Agreement goes beyond the typical free trade
area. In addition to the multilateral compatibility requirements of General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade Article XXIV, a key component of NAFTA that makes it a “free
trade ‘plus’ agreement” is its Chapter 11, referring to foreign direct investment.
With a broad definition of investment, it stipulates national treatment to investors
from the member countries, and most-favored-nation treatment for both investment
and investors, which must be compatible with international law. There are also spe-
cific standards in the case of expropriation and losses due to armed conflict or civil
strife, along with regulations on transfers and environmental matters. More crucially,
it includes provisions for dispute arbitration, where private investors can proceed
against members of government (World Trade Organization, 1996; NAFTA official text).
Nonetheless, to say that NAFTA has been consistent in the narrow terms in which
it was conceived is not the same as to say that there is no room for a critical evaluation
of it. For, clearly, there have been some inconsistencies that need to be addressed, and
the dispute settlement mechanism is a case in point. The mechanisms for settling
trade and investment disputes, along with countervailing duties and antidumping,
as well as some other aspects of the agreement, are dealt with in Chapters 19 and
20, respectively.10 Yet, the capability to start a lawsuit against any of the NAFTA par-
ties is not exempt from controversy, nor is the impact and pace of the ad hoc panel
mechanisms. For example, the World Bank argues that the panel review mechanisms
have had no significant impact on U.S. antidumping and countervailing duties
against Mexico and Canada. As the United States is the two countries’ most impor-
tant trading partner, it is not surprising to find relevant cases there. Commenting
on the adequacy of NAFTA, the World Bank draws lessons from which the rest of the
Latin American countries may benefit. Among the “findings” is correcting the dis-
tortions caused by the rules of origin, because they represent additional costs to
firms wishing to use the preferences of their agreement for their exports. Relocation
does not become an option for companies based in any of the three countries if they
are to satisfy the requirements for exporting the final product to the U.S. free of duty
(Lederman, Maloney and Servén, 2003).
Regarding the ad hocmechanisms for settling trade and investment disputes, if
the lack of a permanent court, which would have entailed a permanent bureaucra-
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10 NAFTA contains formal dispute settlement provisions in six areas: Chapter 11 aims to resolve investor-
state disputes over property rights. Chapter 14 creates provisions for handling financial sector disputes.
Chapter 19 focuses on review mechanisms for antidumping and countervailing duties. Chapter 20 pro-
vides government-to-government consultation, at the ministerial level, for dispute resolution.Additionally,
there are also specific provisions in both the environmental and labor side agreements. There is one inter-
state dispute settlement mechanism regarding domestic environmental laws, and another that fits under
the respective labor side agreements (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005).
cy, has been highlighted as a key feature of the treaty, its operation suggests that
more needs to be done to gain cumulative experience and expertise from non-per-
manent panelists. Furthermore, regarding investors’ disputes, NAFTA’s Chapter 11
allows private firms to sue governments for any changes since the agreement entered
into force. Sensible as these steps might seem at first glance, this provision has back-
fired against some other NAFTA regulations. Specifically, it has been used against new
environmental rules perceived as potentially harmful, or which could reduce invest-
ments, and were not in existence when the investors began operations. The problem
is that the side agreement on the environment encourages a more rigorous upgrading
of standards. Furthermore, the confidentiality of court proceedings is clearly not the
best procedure for dealing with these issues. Hence, there is a clear need to change
these practices to make the court procedures more transparent and also to narrow
the scope of the provisions (Pastor, 2001).
Mexico, Canada and the United States are World Trade Organization members
as well. Perhaps the most important similarity between the WTO and the regional
trade agreement is that neither WTO nor NAFTA dispute settlement procedures have
independent authority over national legislatures or domestic courts. On the other
hand, some critics point to the overlapping jurisdiction between NAFTA and WTO dis-
pute settlement mechanisms, where the latter’s single, integrated system aims to
avoid procedural controversies. Unlike the WTO, NAFTA’s rosters of panelists are cit-
izens of either party to the dispute. Timelines for arbitration do not coincide either.
Criticisms of both NAFTA and the WTO’s lack of transparency in settlement proceed-
ings were key for pushing the former’s ministerial-supported open hearings. Hence,
it has been suggested that for NAFTA, stronger institutions would facilitate dispute
resolution and strengthen the accord (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005). Let us next take
a closer look at some other challenges, as preliminary approximations, that a deep-
ening process of integration would entail.
THE CHALLENGE OF DEEPENING INTEGRATION: NAFTA IN THE FUTURE
NAFTA’s relative success in its own terms in attracting trade and investment has sig-
nificantly grown since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the composition of trade features
important degrees of integration shown in the volume of intra-industry trade. Of
all the Latin American and Caribbean countries that exchange goods and services
with the United States, it is Mexico that has reached the highest level of integration
into U.S. commodity chains, pointing toward the construction of a single economic
space (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001a). This cannot be exclusively attributed to NAFTA’s
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success. Although the North American Free Trade Agreement was not the jumping-
off point for trade and investment among its members, it served to institutionalize
them. Trade and economic integration began several years before the agreement. By
the time it was signed, both the volume and value of intra-industry trade were
already high. Moreover, the intra-industry trade, which can be explained by a com-
bination of product differentiation, economies of scale, and imperfect competition,
could also be extended to the service sector.11 Although considered typical of trade
between developed economies, for the Mexican case, intra-industry trade is a reflec-
tion of the high concentration of dozens of outwardly-oriented firms. Those com-
panies not only export considerable volumes but are simultaneously behind even faster
growing imports. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that subsidiaries of multina-
tional corporations account for an important share of these transactions, especially
in the form of intra-firm trade (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001a; Pastor, 2001).
Nevertheless, for a hermeneutic strategic relational perspective, there can be
absolutely no argument about the fact that the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment has been a catalyst for much more than trade integration alone. Since trade
relations do not occur in isolation from other activities and contextual issues, NAFTA’s
failures are linked to its stark omissions. Celebrated as a free trade area in which a
developing economy has joined two developed economies, it is striking that from
the very beginning the North American Free Trade Agreement was negotiated as if
there were no asymmetries among the countries. Making no mention of the contrast-
ing differences in the size and weight of the markets, it takes for granted that eco-
nomic growth depends mainly on trade. Were there perfect competition, we should
not have to pay attention to issues of monopolistic markets and imperfect informa-
tion. It was neither impossible to sustain the unrealistic assumptions that the levels
of economic development were similar and comparable; nor that there were no vul-
nerabilities in any member; nor that disparities were non-existent in their societies.
Those unrealistic assumptions reflected an inattention to the socially embedded
character of economic activities within broader social and political contexts. Had
such factors featured prominently in the negotiations, the various consequences of
the elimination of trade and investment barriers would have been considered. They
clearly range from social to environmental and political impacts. The fact that the NAFTA
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11 Intra-industry trade means that exchanged goods have comparable qualities or characteristics and could
follow two different modalities. The vertical kind is considered severe and consistent with international
trade flows, where a difference in factor endowments is the main determinant. For this case, a big differ-
ence in price between traded goods is evident. In contrast, the horizontal mode entails small differences
in quality and prices between the commodities exchanged. Due to the asymmetries in purchasing power
and income between Mexico and the United States, the contrasting features, qualities, and prices of trad-
ed goods reflect vertical intra-industry trade (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001a).
side agreements on labor and the environment were partially considered as exter-
nalities reflects its narrow design and unveils the challenge to amend its goals and
refocus its emphasis and orientation (Pastor, 2001; Kingsolver, 2001; Poitras, 2001).
Short-sightedness is also reflected in the belief that only the countries’ govern-
ments are capable of solving all problems which may arise, acting as leaders of their
own societies. Likewise, the argument that the economic benefits would “trickle
down” to all of society from the “free” market place is deeply ingrained in the posi-
tion of neoclassical economics. Even though analysts praise the economic integration
associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement, a great many of them
fail to acknowledge the process’s extraordinary complexity. It is not by any means
restricted only –or mainly– to trade relations. The dimensions of the social process-
es clearly exceed the agreement’s framework. A process of social integration has con-
tributed toward creating a historical coalescence of the three countries greater than
any before (Pastor, 2001; Kingsolver, 2001; Poitras, 2001).
One of the explanations for the NAFTA framework’s deficiencies, present in most
of the routine contacts, is the lack of a genuine trilateral approach. The sum of two
bilateral relationships, namely the United States–Canada, on the one hand, and the
United States–Mexico, on the other, does not make a trilateral mechanism (Pastor,
2001). Even though Canadian–Mexican relations have recently become more sig-
nificant, they still constitute the weakest front of the association. Moreover, very lit-
tle progress has been made in forging common policies; this can be attributed to the
narrow original conception of NAFTA. Partly because of the asymmetry between the
U.S. and the other members, and partly because of routine procedures that have
prevented the recognition that a potential community is developing and could be
further developed, NAFTA does not in any way represent a comprehensive strategy.
In addition to the increasing degree of constant interactions, international migration
is high, and people from Latin America in general, and from Mexico in particular,
represent a large share of both legal and illegal immigrants to the United States. For
a number of them, the rising degrees of polarization and widening income gap at
home makes them move to a place where they can increase their standard of living.
As long as strong economic incentives for migration exist, the flow of people can-
not be easily contained.12 Awhole range of issues are closely associated with migra-
tory trends. One is the importance of those whose remittances represent one of
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12 Originally established for migrant workers during World War II, the Bracero Program allowed Mexicans
to temporarily work in the United States, especially in low-skilled activities. Its official end in the mid-
1960s resulted in migration becoming undocumented (Aguayo, 1998; Domínguez and Fernández de
Castro, 2001). Despite the U.S. preference for dealing with migration unilaterally, passing new regula-
tions, and a range of strategies for tightening control at the border, the flow of people has not decreased.
The main noticeable change has been the selection of the routes which the illegal immigrants take.
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Mexico’s most significant sources of income and whose political influence has also
grown. Since millions of Latinos are eligible to vote in the United States, at the same
time that their ineligibility to vote in Mexican elections abroad is being reconsidered,
political parties from both sides of the border are inclined to court them.
A comprehensive trilateral approach would reconsider immigration and income
gaps as manifestations of the same phenomenon. So far, most of the issues Canada,
the United States, and Mexico deal with are considered in isolation from the rest, as
if they were completely disconnected from their context. Such considerations are
inappropriate in an extraordinarily complex process of integration. The process is
currently underway and can be analyzed interpretatively. If, as some analysts have
suggested, the North American Free Trade Agreement should be deepened and rein-
forced, a preliminary consideration, especially strong in the Mexican case, but also
relevant in the other countries, should be to reduce and eradicate the degree of asym-
metry. For the deepening of the current situation would also mean deepening the
income disparities and inequalities. If this scenario is to be avoided in Mexico, there
should be no delay in articulating and reinvigorating economic activities’ forward
and backward linkages, integrating more the import-prone, export-oriented sectors
which have a low impact on labor due to the relatively low share of the work force
they employ and the domestically-oriented firms where most people work. Hence,
tackling asymmetries is of the utmost importance if integration is to succeed.
Even though the Mexican government has been timidly designing and imple-
menting programs that make use of articulated incentives to strengthen the inter-sec-
toral and geographical links, much more needs to be done. Indeed, more strongly
orienting productive and redistributive economic activities toward more equitable
practices is urgently needed. As this is a complex issue, disarticulated and partial
approaches will not do. A consistently long, sustained effort is needed, one not abort-
ed by the pervasive six-year –or even shorter– programs that every administration
puts into practice while in office.Aconsistent and sustained effort, part of an enhanced
agenda of reform, requires political will and commitment. Guided by an ethical
concern and a normative position, a broader, more equitable social, political, and
economic transformation that makes use of networking could be of great help for
redistribution. If put into practice openly, inclusively, and democratically, it is more
likely that consistent aims and coherent strategies could be developed, where trans-
parency and accountability would be vital. Acknowledging that the social process-
The United States’ most recent unilateral effort is building a fence on its side of the border with Mexico.
This initiative not only sends an extremely poor diplomatic message of distrust and unneighborly rela-
tions for an economic partner and political ally, but does not address the migration issue comprehensively,
as this complex phenomenon clearly requires. Such one way courses of action and unilateral policies are
doomed to catastrophic failure and very bitter opposition both at home and abroad.
es of change are by no means opposed to the idea of integration requires, in turn,
the recognition of the political nature of the courses of action chosen.
From the perspective of the NAFTA partners, it is worth taking into account one
of the European Union’s historical lessons. Its members openly embraced the goal of
reducing disparities and promoting development. In so doing, they created social
cohesion and structural funds available for the poorest countries and straggling re-
gions (Pastor, 2001).13 The main idea of reducing inequalities and raising living
standards fairly and equitably has contributed to building a sense of community
currently developing and gaining ground in Western Europe. This is one thing, among
others, that puts the European Union on a different footing from the less institution-
alized, more restricted and narrowly conceived forms of integration which mainly
privilege trade relations in the pursuit of economic growth. Though the EU has also
been characterised as an essentially neoliberal project, it offers important lessons.
Following neoclassical economic orthodoxy, it has been suggested that achiev-
ing soaring trade and investment flows could further benefit from greater reductions
in transaction costs. Thus, monetary policies are highly relevant parts of economic
integration processes. Unquestionably, the dominant currency in the region is the
U.S. dollar. The absence of an economy that could balance the United States’ weight
and leverage in the Americas has led some to suggest various options for macro-
economic policy coordination and currency management. They range from allowing
flotation, to pegging currencies to the U.S. dollar, adopting a common currency, or
even replacing the national currency with the dollar (Pastor, 2001). Flotation is sup-
posed to allow a currency’s free movement. However, in reality, in many cases such
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13 The case of the European Union is extraordinary in this sense, and its historical experience illuminates
the economic integration process. Declaring the goal of reducing levels of inequality among its members,
the main purpose of the European Social Fund was for vocational training and changing jobs, while the
European Agricultural Fund gave grants to farmers to help them develop rural areas. The European
Investment Bank provided loans in regions lagging behind. After the funds and resources were reorga-
nized in the mid-1990s, the Cohesion Fund targeted the poorest countries. As increased income for spend-
ing on goods and services became available, it was mainly used to improve infrastructure and education
with the aim of enhancing the productive potential of the country where these resources were channeled.
The benefits did not stop there, however. They had multiplier effects because the cohesion funds con-
tributed toward encouraging foreign direct investment. The Structural Funds provided resources for
adjustments in agriculture, fisheries, and scarcely populated areas, along with regional development and
social concerns. Lagging regional development, industrial decline, youth employment, and training for
workers were also considered (Pastor, 2001).
Previous Mexican government administrations proposed an initiative for the straggler states in the
southern part of the country. The Puebla-Panama Plan targeted attracting investment for infrastructure,
which would, in turn, improve the overall economic situation and create brand new jobs in Puebla, Ve-
racruz, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas. Moreover, the proj-
ect went beyond the borders as it included the participation of Central American countries at the same
time: Guatemala, Belize, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Panama. Whether the plan
fulfills its potential remains to be seen.
schemes are distorted when a currency faces interventions from central banks, mak-
ing for a “dirty flotation”. This is the current situation in Mexico.
The controversy about dollarization is that the benefits of financial stability
conducive to diminishing transaction costs, on the one hand, and a steadier fiscal
discipline that would lower inflation, on the other, are outweighed by the problems
this stability entails (Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, 2003). For a country to adopt the
U.S. dollar as its national currency would mean sacrificing its seigniorage capacity,
depriving it of control and the profits from printing its own money. It would also
mean eliminating a shock absorber mechanism, especially in times of recession and
unemployment. Furthermore, it would take the form of a transfer of power to the
U. S. Federal Reserve, which sets interest rates exclusively in response to business
cycles in its own country (Pastor, 2001). If Canadian and Mexican districts were
added to the U.S. Federal Reserve, the entire monetary policy would respond to U.S.
business cycles alone, not those of Canada and Mexico.
However remote it might seem today, it might be better in the long term to
work toward building a common currency (Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, 2003).
What this would mean is forging a monetary union, with a central bank that would
reflect the members’ importance, weight and power, but at the same time would allow
some room for each country to manage and make decisions about its national cur-
rency and seigniorage. If this is going to be operational, it needs to reflect the wealth
of the three economies proportionally and the equivalences of the exchange rates
(Pastor, 2001). Sensitive topic that it is, it must be addressed with caution in a gen-
uine trilateral networking approach; otherwise it may be doomed to failure. It is
important to bear in mind that a similar project took the European Union decades
to build. It might take even longer on this side of the Atlantic. But if realistic positions
are presented at the negotiation table, it would represent an opportunity for promot-
ing the well-being of the people, and also for forging a sense of community. Hence,
such a project is certainly worth embracing. The complications going beyond the
current shallow integration process are most likely to affect both all the levels of
society and government regulations, policies, and programmes. For, if deepening is
not going to be strictly limited to trade relations, the social processes of integration
certainly require refocusing government policies in an inclusive, realistic, democratic,
and accountable way. Deepening integration is not only about trade and investment
flows. It is a social, dynamic, open-ended process as well. Therefore, it must be
acknowledged as such, and approached accordingly, because it might represent an
opportunity for “double movement” decommodification trends (Polanyi, 1957).14
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14 A “double movement” is organized by the principles of economic liberalism and social protection.
Market expansions are met by counter-movements. Protecting society is a key consideration, acknowl-
Unlike the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement signed
by Canada, the United States and Mexico did not explicitly aim to create a commu-
nity of people from the region. Still, it does not rule out the idea tout court (Kingsolver,
2001; Poitras, 2001). If this goal is to be incorporated, however, along with the ex-
plicit promotion of the population’s well-being, in order to extend its original nar-
row agenda, it must be tackled trilaterally by making use of different networking
mechanisms. It must also recognize the key features of current social processes, just
as it did with economic restructuring some time ago. In this sense, gradual, step-by-
step approaches, such as the proposals for a migratory accord, or visa waivers for
Mexicans who cross the border regularly, tend to timidly reflect the social dynamic
of integration, in which the governments of the region lag behind the dynamics and
tendencies set in motion by their own societies.
For it is clearly impossible to disassociate the much-praised benefits of econom-
ic integration without realizing that such tendencies are constituent parts of broad-
er social contexts. Important as they are, economic transactions and relations of
exchange are merely one element in the processes and dynamics of social integra-
tion. Therefore, NAFTA’s consistency in its stated trade and investment goals does
not exhaust the broad range of interactions which, in an incremental and punctuat-
ed fashion, transform the contexts in which actors are situated. Making use of an
interpretative strategic relational approach, it becomes clear that, if social integra-
tion is to succeed, one long-term goal must be to embed a spirit of inclusiveness,
openness and reciprocity oriented toward achieving and shaping a sense of com-
munity, which, in turn, is respectful of differences. At the same time, it must seek to
rule out unilateralism and bilateral tactics, thus making use of common approach-
es for addressing collective problems (Pastor, 2001). This kind of agenda must
establish a vision of transformation and acknowledge that a basic prerequisite is the
reduction of asymmetries, inequalities, and polarization. The objectives must rec-
ognize the socially embedded character of economic activities and the urgency of
leveling the playing field. Complementary aims must be realistic and encourage
consistent actions.
Thus, the enhanced agenda of reform for Mexico is highly compatible with and
complements the aim of forging a sense of community in Mexico, Canada, and the
United States as a long-term goal. In the short term, however, the project of a Free
Trade Area of the Americas has absorbed these countries’ efforts.
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edging the need for intervention against the market and using protective legislation to conserve both
man and nature as well as the organization of production (Polanyi, 1957).
BROADENING THE NARROW FRAMEWORK MODEL:
HEMISPHERIC TRADE UNDER THE FTAA
Since the U.S. government launched the Initiative for the Americas in the 1990s, the
project for broadening the shallow integration of NAFTA to the rest of the Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean countries was mostly welcomed in the hemisphere.15 Based on
this treaty’s unrealistic assumptions, namely, of non-existent asymmetries, the prom-
ise of growth and development attracted interest in one of the most unequal regions
of the world. Needless to say, the proposed FTAA would have been a daunting task,
which should not have been restricted to trade relations alone, and which also
would have been highly political.
The invitation presented to 34 democratic governments to consider their par-
ticipation sought to encompass almost all of the Americas by the now missed dead-
line of 2005. It purposely left Cuba aside on the basis of its different socio-political
and economic organization. The four main interrelated objectives listed in the Dec-
laration of Principles of the Summit of the Americas favored the preservation and
strengthening of the community of democracies in the hemisphere, while also pro-
moting prosperity through economic integration and free trade. The agenda was
complemented by aiming to eradicate hemispheric poverty and discrimination, at
the same time that it sought to guarantee sustainable development and preserve the
environment.16
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15 Yet, it should be borne in mind that the idea of integration in the Americas is by no means new. Dating back
to the early nineteenth century when most Latin American countries were gaining independence from
Spanish rule, Bolívar, the Liberator of South American nations, sketched ideas of integration in the form of a
continental federation or federative convention, as recorded in the Congress of Panama. Although unable to
turn these thoughts into reality, his ideas of supra-nationalism and integration, even if restricted to Spanish
American republics, gained notoriety and influence (Collier, 1983). Despite the fact that participants in Pan-
ama addressed neither Panamericanism, nor Latin American solidarity strictly speaking, the congress is a
key precedent to the Conference of the American States of the 1890s, and the birth of the Organization of
American States (OAS) six decades later (Mora, 1960). Arising from Americanist idealism, Bolívar’s efforts
remain a source of inspiration in his own continent, while lessons have been learned from his failures as well.
A different perspective is provided by U.S. foreign policy and Latin American history. For the United
States, a hemisphere where all the nations not only accept, but also embrace the political, social, and eco-
nomic principles and practices it endorses has been a historical aspiration.
The Monroe doctrine formulated in the early nineteenth century was isolationist. It opposed extra-
hemispheric intervention in the whole of the Americas. Nonetheless, it was amended through various co-
rollaries and interpretations to allow the United States the discretionary and unilateral use of violence to deal
with a wide range of scenarios in Latin America and the Caribbean. Arguing against non-colonization, it
contained a warning against meddling in Europe and a defense of non-interference or isolationism. It is a
unilateral position based on limited knowledge lacking any consistent legal foundation which masks a ra-
tionale for U.S. intervention, tailoring its interpretation to a myriad of situations in specific countries, or
in the region as a whole. It has been used to facilitate pro-U.S. governments wishing to accommodate
their economic interests, at the same time that it has provided a tool to eliminate those who sought more
independent social, political, and economic paths (Dent, 1999).
16 The Summit of the Americas Plan of Action signed in Miami listed 23 points related to the agenda’s broad
four objectives.
Two different groups of countries could be easily distinguished among the
negotiators. One supported advancing negotiations, whereas the other argued that
the conditions do not yet exist for the FTAA to be achieved. Thus, for the time being, it
is too early to speculate on whether the project of the Free Trade Area of the Amer-
icas would, in the long run, tilt toward a Community of the Americas.
It became clear that the Free Trade Area of the Americas was a daunting task be-
cause it aimed to incorporate in a hemispheric format twoof theworld’s richest countries
with some of the poorest, straggling economies and some middle-income countries. The
size of the economies could hardly cover a broader spectrum. They went from the
biggest, most developed and most diversified in the world to the smallest and most
vulnerable. The FTAA aimed to be compatible within the multilateral framework of the
WTO/GATT, and also with the numerous free trade agreements the Latin American
and Caribbean countries have subscribed to not only among themselves, but also
with trading partners in other parts of the world. The widening of this big umbrella
sought also to include preferential agreements, unilateral preferential arrangements,
general association and cooperation schemes, customs unions, and other regional
bodies. Thus, the Free Trade Area of the Americas could have been one of the most
ambitious integration projects ever attempted. Unlike previous free trade agree-
ments and integration efforts, the United States was pushing the initiative forward.
Nowadays, the U.S. operates on three different economic negotiation fronts at the
same time. It has not abandoned its preference for multilateralism and GATT/WTO
negotiation rounds. What it additionally did was to put its weight behind the FTAA,
while also reaching bilateral agreements.17
Nonetheless, since the early negotiations hindered the feasibility of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas, one of the problems was the lack of a U.S. fast-track
authority to show the rest of the participants a genuine level of commitment match-
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The first Summit of the Americas took place in Miami, United States in 1994. It was followed by the
1998 Santiago summit hosted by Chile and the 2001 Quebec Summit in Canada. The fourth Summit
of the Americas was held in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2004, and the most recent one a year later in Mar del
Plata, Argentina. All of them issued declarations.
17 Apart from NAFTA, the United States has signed free trade agreements with Israel, Chile, Jordan, and
Singapore. The U.S. recently ratified the Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), with Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. These Central Amer-
ican countries are not only already highly open and integrated with the U.S., but their economies are also
highly dollarized (Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, 2003). DR-CAFTA merely institutionalizes the strong
current pattern (Jaramillo and Lederman, 2005). It has also signed free trade agreements that are not cur-
rently enforced including with Colombia, Oman, Panama, Peru, and South Korea. Furthermore, it is very
likely that the United States will increase the number of free trade partners in the future.
Canada has signed free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, and Israel. Since the Canadians also
play an active part in regionalism, they are currently negotiating with El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, the European Free Trade Association, and Singapore. Moreover, it seems that CARICOM, the
Dominican Republic, and the Andean Community will be added to the list in the short term as well.
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ing the one it demanded. A fast-track authority is basically a mechanism meant to
provide certainty to foreign countries negotiating trade agreements with the United
States.18 It forces the U.S. Congress to only vote in favor or against a treaty, without
allowing it to make any amendments, and therefore substantially limits the amount
of debate it could face (Schott, 2001; Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001).
Since fast-track authority was no longer an option for the FTAA’s overstated hemi-
spheric project, the U.S. had also committed itself to multilateral and bilateral nego-
tiations. This strategy of negotiating simultaneously on three different fronts has been
typical of the U.S. and clearly discernible since the time of GATT’s Uruguay Round.
There is no question that, for the United States, the Free Trade Area of the Amer-
icas would have been a good deal, as it would have required only a few changes in
its current trade barriers and legal and regulatory frameworks. The burden of the
adjustment would have fallen to the Latin American and Caribbean economies. The
FTAA, it was proposed, would have helped to avert discrimination and offer oppor-
tunities for U.S. firms to export and invest in these markets. It was expected that the
lowering of barriers to trade and investment would benefit trade, productivity, and
U.S. workers’ income. Furthermore, the perception was that the hemispheric proj-
ect could have had spillover effects for overall relations within the region around
issues like outlawing drugs, the environment, and labor and education reform. It
was also hoped that it could have promoted international cooperation among the
parties on pressing social, economic, and political problems (Schott, 2001).
This might strike us as an irony, because the whole negotiation setting had
assumed that there were no asymmetries, and that the promised growth and devel-
opment would have trickled down to the members. Therefore, from an interpretive
perspective, the idea of widening the North American Free Trade Agreement entailed
widening the unrealistic assumptions based on which it was negotiated, and under
which it is currently operating, to reach more countries in the Americas. The incen-
tive for most of the Latin American and Caribbean economies was based on the
engagement of the United States. For a number of them, the U.S. represents one of
the most important sources of trade and investment, the main exceptions being
Mercosur and Chile. Mercosur’s priorities are oriented toward the European Union
(Bulmer-Thomas and Dunkerley, 1999).19
It comes as no surprise that some of the benefits of the proposed FTAA were
identical to the ones suggested prior to the ratification and coming into force of
18 It was introduced by the United States Omnibus Trade Act of 1974 (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro,
2001).
19 Even though Mercosur members differ in their particular positions and priorities, they spoke with one voice
during the FTAA negotiations. Reflecting the relative weight of their economies, the two biggest markets
in the hemisphere, namely the United States and Brazil, co-chaired the final stages of the negotiations.
NAFTA (Weintraub, 2000). Hence, the suggestion of “locking in” economic reforms
and the provision of a sort of “insurance policy” against protectionism at home and
unilateralism abroad were not new at all. It was not likely to protect all industries
against unilateral antidumping practices. The Free Trade Area of the Americas
would have approached uneven levels of economic development by making use of
the strategy agreed on in NAFTA. Thus, it followed a widened negotiation procedure
that encouraged countries to accept the whole set of common obligations, but made
allowances for negotiating different implementation schedules. Since each country
could set its own external tariffs, they did not necessarily need to stick and bind
themselves to a certain level, but could choose what best suited them. The FTAA was
presented as an indivisible package or single undertaking, where the decision mak-
ing procedure was consensual.
Such an approach, which privileged outwardly oriented economic policies, ran
the risk of further de-coupling the import-prone, export-oriented sectors from the
rest of the domestically oriented sectors. Similarly to Mexico, most of the Latin
American and Caribbean countries might have found that a handful of firms would
have taken full advantage of the FTAA with a small impact on the work force and the
population’s living standards. Depending on the degree of integration with the U.S.
as the most developed economy and hub of the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
intra-industry trade might have increased, as might intra-firm trade. If the worst-case
scenario of polarization was to be avoided, it was necessary to go beyond different
tariff reduction schedules, in order to acknowledge the asymmetries between the
negotiating countries more realistically. Yet, ruling out the possibility of a more equi-
table negotiation and final outcome was a failure to recognize the open-ended charac-
ter of the social processes of change. For power is not only about decision making,
agenda setting, and preference shaping; it becomes evident in all social relations
where economic transactions are submerged in a broader social context (Lukes, 1974;
Foucault, 1990, 1977 and 1976; Hay, 2002; Polanyi, 1957, 1992, and 1996).
If the small and least developed economies had sought to keep themselves free
of economic reductionism and deterministic logics, the task ahead for the small
economies of the region, which amounts to eliminating two-thirds of the negotia-
tors, could have been challenging. The most critical cases were those where the
countries depend heavily on foreign trade and investment and sometimes on a sin-
gle commodity or service, and where physical infrastructure is underdeveloped
and their human and technological resources are poor (Schott, 2001). Critical stages
of commodification, along the lines of Polanyi’s first movement, would have meant
that the desirable rates of economic growth and development would not have come
easily, let alone be likely to “trickle down”. The situation would had been even
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more serious when encouraged by improving “readiness indicators”, whereby
international vulnerabilities might have accentuated, becoming more responsive to
changes in foreign supply and demand, thus affecting movements in foreign capital
and the exchange rate market, and diverting them from the domestic sector.20 In par-
ticular, this was similar to the synchronized aggregate economic fluctuations of Mexico
vis-à-vis the United States. This is likely to occur with a number of Latin American
and Caribbean countries (Schott, 2001; Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, 2003).
The standard advice of strengthening domestic economic reforms and improv-
ing the institutional framework to help create growth opportunities both in new
and traditional sectors provides a difficult panorama for the diversification of pro-
duction and the expansion of employment opportunities. This is because countries
in Latin America and the Caribbean interested in joining a process of integration via
the Free Trade Area of the Americas proposal were left to cope on their own while
“unilaterally” undergoing a structural reconstitution of their economies. Their com-
mitment to a shallow free trade area was not rewarded by acknowledging the urgency
of reducing the sometimes abysmal inequalities. As the NAFTA model was exported to
the rest of the hemisphere, so were its omissions, such as the lack of social cohesion
and structural funds. Had such features existed, they would have represented more
realistic opportunities, and valuable resources for helping the whole hemisphere
achieve endogenous equitable growth and better income distribution. In the long
run, if the FTAA, or any alternative hemispheric agreement, is to reap all those prom-
ises of development, its success will depend heavily on the reduction of inequali-
ties within sectors, societies, and regions. But it is never too late to readjust the course
of action: the sooner, the better.
It is important to bear in mind that an enhanced agenda for reform should not
surrender international interactions and commitments. What it should do is to pro-
pose more balanced goals and strategies between international and domestic agen-
das. For, hermeneutically argued, this by no means reveals the pursuit of radically
opposite aims, since there is room for enhancing broader and more inclusive strate-
gies for the preservation and strengthening of democracy. Similarly, in this kind of
reform agenda, with the socially embedded character of promoting prosperity through
economic integration and free trade, it is necessary also to be attentive to and proac-
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20 Schott proposed a benchmark for making estimates of the relative economic performance and competi-
tive capability of the various Latin American and the Caribbean countries. The “readiness indicators”
comprised three main indices. The first was made up of selected macroeconomic indicators like price sta-
bility, budget discipline, national savings, external debt, and currency stability. The second considered
market-oriented policies and reliance on trade duties as the main components of the market indicator.
The third assessed policy sustainability. Finally, the readiness indicator reflected the average of the main
indices. According to Schott, the indicators of the region as a whole, and for most of the individual cases,
have improved since the mid-1990s (2001).
tive about eradicating poverty and discrimination. Needless to say, this must also
make a priority of achieving sustainable development and preserving the environ-
ment. Pursuing all these objectives of the Free Trade Area of the Americas does coin-
cide with a transformation of society, by putting it back in control of the processes.
However, this kind of collective enterprise would probably encounter problems in
its realization. Yet, if appropriate strategies are selected, the goals will remain in the
realm of the possible. This is the opportunity that can be seized.
CONCLUSIONS
The main argument presented here is that the strategically selective context within
which actors interact does not necessarily determine their courses of action, either
already taken, or yet to be taken. For, the material and ideational circumstances in
specific geographic and historical limits are also, in turn, continuously reshaped by
the situated agents in a specific spatio-temporal context.
This article focused on the circumstances surrounding the social processes of
change in contemporary Mexico. It highlights key trends and countertrends which
may help us understand and explain the open-ended, contingent nature of the social-
ly embedded contemporary phenomena under scrutiny. And it pays attention to
different aspects of the international dimensions.
The value added by this is a richer, more comprehensive perspective which
attends to the social, political, and historical tendencies and undertows, as they set the
stage for examining issues and agendas that can be considered closer to the Mexican
experience. Volumes have been filled examining Mexico’s relationships with the
United States. My emphasis is mainly on discussing current processes.
I do not stop there, however. Since I undertake a realist, process-tracing exercise
throughout the article, I also hint at the crucial issues that lie ahead. Particularly
important are the challenges of deepening the shallow integration process of inte-
gration posed by the North American Free Trade Agreement, on the one hand, and
the broadening of a hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas, on the other. A
hermeneutic perspective has explanatory power at the regional level, warning of
the risk of increasing processes of commodification if the unrealistic assumptions on
which NAFTA was negotiated are not revised. Although the agreement has been con-
sistent in the narrow terms in which it was conceived, its deficiencies must urgently
be addressed. It is equally urgent to incorporate reducing inequalities and forging
a community as central goals. Furthermore, the theoretical tools used here also
point to the daunting task the FTAA represents and warn against negotiators uncrit-
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ically accepting unrealistic assumptions, which might have future intended and
unintended consequences. For the smallest, weakest economies, increased trade
and investment flows might not have a strong enough desired impact on labor, for
they would send more income to the rich and polarization could intensify.
Polanyi explicitly warned against the stark utopia of “self-regulating” markets
(1957). In his view, if historical transformations are to succeed, they do not only depend
on economic self-adjustments. Therefore, due to the socially embedded character of
human activities, the success of both national and international processes of change
depends on the society in which they are embedded.
The socially embedded character of economic activities demonstrates that they
are situated within a broader social and political context. Political as they are, it is
a central claim of this article that processes of integration mean much more than
increasing trade and investment. If we acknowledge the embeddedness of economic
activities, the landscape of integration reveals political and social characteristics
pointing toward the potential for forging a community that might take decades to
emerge. Relevant as they are, we do not only need to take a closer look at Mexico-U.S.
relations. For acknowledging the consistency in the narrow terms in which the North
American Free Trade Agreement is designed should not prevent action to tackle its
omissions and deficiencies. Challenges ahead include reducing the widening gaps
of inequality on the one hand and forging a strong sense and idea of community on
the other. They are clearly needed for deeper and more consistent integration. NAFTA’s
shallow model, should it be exported to the Americas, exposes the Free Trade Area
of the Americas´ smallest and weakest economies to a situation in which trade and
investment might flow, but inequalities and polarization might worsen.
Clearly, some social and political dimensions of the North American Free Trade
Agreement have been neglected and subordinated to economic exchanges. However,
it is evident that in the medium and long-term the success or failure of integration
trends will depend on the societies in which they are embedded. It is imperative that
the widening disparities between and within countries, regions, and sectors be halt-
ed and corrected. Such a prerequisite would, in turn, reflect the acknowledgment of
the socially embedded character of economic activities. There is no doubt that in an
optimal scenario, inequalities must be eliminated –or at least reduced– to start mov-
ing toward forging a community in the region. What this would entail is acknowl-
edging the leading role of the social and political aspect of the transformations
associated with the process of integration. Distant as this scenario might seem, it is
one which, in the end, will be most likely to succeed, since the societies in these coun-
tries are the ones which ultimately dictate the success of the processes of change.
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As the North American Free Trade Agreement unfolds, it would provide an
exceptional opportunity for updating developments and tracing their key features
and issues. Both NAFTA and the FTAA proposal show the lack of a sense of commu-
nity, and scant interest in forging it, plus the inexistence of cohesion and structural
funds. These are telling examples. Clearly, much can be learned from both the EU
agenda and experience.
The FTAA’s already missed deadline provides an excellent opportunity for recon-
sidering both the assumptions and omissions of such an ambitious regional trade
agreement. If a hemispheric proposal is to succeed, it needs to take into account
national variations more. Cohesion of a region is key if it is to succeed. In case of
this integration project, it must be socially constructed, not deterministically accept-
ed, by paying attention to its strengths and weaknesses. The Americas are extreme-
ly far behind the goal of a cohesive region due to their socio-economic and political
disparities and inequalities. These problems must be urgently addressed. Equally
important, efforts toward forging an authentic sense, goal and idea of community
must not be postponed indefinitely.Acohesive region stretching fromAlaska to Tierra
del Fuego demands action and a clear purpose. We can all help build them.
The originally enthusiastic and contagious initiative for a hemispheric integra-
tion scheme for the new world has now cooled off. On the one hand, the interna-
tional context during the late 2000s is not as conducive as it used to be during the
early part of the decade. Slowed economic performance in the hemisphere’s biggest
economies and the low priority the U.S. government has granted it versus the high
priority of its wars on Afghanistan and Iraq are perceived abroad as a non-propi-
tious context for such an engagement. On the other hand, domestic politics have
played an important role. The rise of left regimes in Latin America, though they are
significantly different from one another, contrasts with the neo-liberal and pro-U.S.
wave of governments that preceded them during the 1990s. For a very big share of
Latin Americans, the payoffs of liberalization, privatization, and deregulation strate-
gies have been meagre and disappointing to date. On top of that, the international
momentum of Bush, Jr.’s second term has lost appeal, as U.S. citizens focus more on
the domestic agenda during their 2008 presidential campaigns.
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